Abstract. We consider the filter generator over GF (2 m ) consisting of a linear feedback shift register of length k that generates a maximal length linear sequence of period 2 mk − 1 over GF (2 m ) and a Boolean function of degree d that combines bits from one element in the shift register (considered as an element in GF (2) m ) and creates a binary output bit zt at any time t. We show how to extend a recent attack by the authors on the binary filter generator to the filter generator over GF (2 m ). The attack recovers the initial state of the filter generator from L keystream bits with complexity O(L), after a pre-computation with complexity O(L (log2L) 3 ), where L is the linear complexity upper bounded by
Introduction
The filter generator over GF (2) uses a linear feedback shift register of length n that generates a maximal linear sequence (an m-sequence) of period 2 n − 1 in combination with a nonlinear Boolean function f of degree d that combines output from the shift register (s t , s t+1 , . . . , s t+n−1 ) at any time t and produces an output bit z t . The filter generator is an important building block in stream ciphers and some of the eSTREAM candidates make use of the filter generator as a major component.
In a recent paper [6] Rønjom and Helleseth present a new attack that reconstructs the initial state (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) of the binary filter generator using L keystream bits with complexity O(L), where L is upper bounded by D = d i=1 n i , after a pre-computation of complexity O(L(log 2 L) 3 ). This may be compared with the standard algebraic attacks that reconstructs the initial state with complexity O(D 3 ). For some basic results on algebraic attacks the reader is referred to [1] , [2] and [4] .
The main idea in [6] is to use the underlying structure of m-sequences to improve the existing solution techniques for the nonlinear system in the n unknowns s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 obtained from the relations z t = f t (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ), t = 0, 1, . . . , L − 1.
Then we have that f t (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) = f (s t , s t+1 , . . . , s t+n−1 ) ∈ R/J, where R = GF (2)[s 0 , ..., s n−1 ] is reduced over J = {s 2 0 + s 0 , ..., s 2 n−1 + s n−1 }. For any U = {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u r−1 } ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} let s U = s u0 s u1 · · · s ur−1 . Let K U,t be the coefficient for the monomial s U in the corresponding equation at time t. Then we can represent the system of equations in terms of the coefficient sequences K U,t as
The method in [6] shows that all coefficient sequences K U,t where |U | ≥ 2 corresponding to all nonlinear terms obey the same linear recursion with characteristic polynomial p(x) = L−n j=0 p j x j with zeros β J where the Hamming weight of the binary representation of J, denoted wt(J) obeys 2 ≤ J ≤ d = deg(f ). This polynomial can be constructed in the pre-computation phase and has complexity O(L(log 2 L)
3 ) ( [4] ). Here β is a zero of the primitive polynomial that generates the shift register in the filter generator. The pre-computation also computes the n polynomials f * t for t = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 defined by f * t (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) = L−n j=0 p j f t+j (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ). Note that these are linear polynomials since all nonlinear coefficient sequences obey the recursion. Moreover, only f * 0 needs to be computed, since f * 1 , ..., f * n−1 are shifts of the equation f * 0 and the resulting n × n coefficient matrix is thus a Vandermonde type matrix.
To solve the nonlinear equation system to find the initial state s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 for a given keystream z t of L bits, one computes the n bits z * t = L−n j=0 p j z t+j for t = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
The initial state (secret key) (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) can now be determined from the linear system of n equations in the n unknowns s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 given by
In the case when f * 0 = 0 the coefficient matrix of the system will be non-singular. The case f * 0 = 0 has very small probability 2 −n and the attack needs some modifications and may not work so efficiently.
The method above works for a binary filter generator using a linear shift register over GF (2) . Some filter generators such as the WG cipher in the eSTREAM project uses a shift register over GF (2 m ). In this paper a filter generator over an extension field is considered. This filter generator uses a shift register of length k, where all the elements belong to GF (2 m ), in combination with a Boolean function f of degree d. At any time t the Boolean function is a function of the m-bits in a single element (that is considered as an element in GF (2) m ) in the shift register. The WG cipher has k = 11, m = 29, n = mk = 319 and d = 11.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the attack by Rønjom and Helleseth to the filter generator over GF (2 m ). In order to prove this, the analog of the coefficient sequences need to be calculated. Furthermore, they are shown to possess the properties needed to extend the attack in [6] . A particular observation is that when the Boolean function is defined on a single element in the linear feedback shift register, the linear complexity of the keystream z t will typically reduce by a factor of e −d 2 (k−1)/2n compared with the case when the Boolean function acts on all bits in the initial state of linear feedback shift register.
The attack recovers the initial state of the WG cipher in complexity ≈ 2
45.0415
using the same number of keybits, after a pre-computation of complexity 2 62 . One should, however, observe that the designers of the WG ciphers have restricted the number of keybits on a given key to 2 45 . It may also be of interest that the results above can be extended with minor modifications to the cases where the shift register generates any linear recursion.
Preliminaries
Let the sequence {S t } over GF (2 m ) obey a recursion of degree k given by
where g 0 = 0 and g k = 1. For cryptographic applications such as in a filter generator one normally considers the characteristic polynomial g(
of the linear recursion to be a primitive polynomial over GF (2 m ). The sequence {S t } over GF (2 m ) is completely determined by the initial state (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S k−1 ) and the characteristic polynomial g(x). We denote all 2 mk sequences generated by g(x), corresponding to all initial states, by Ω(g(x). The nonzero sequences generated by g(x) are maximal length sequences of period 2 mk − 1 = 2 n − 1, where n = mk. The zeros of g(x) are β 2 mi for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, where β is a primitive element in GF (2 n ). For further information on linear feedback shift registers the reader is referred to [3] .
By repeated use of the recursion we can write S t as a linear combination of the n elements in the initial state. Thus, we have
Note that each of these k sequences obey the same recursion as {S t } and are thus maximal length linear sequences. This follows since it holds for all integers t that
This relation holds for any initial state (S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S n−1 ). For example, letting S i = 1 and S l = 0 for the remaining elements in the initial state, it follows that each {L it } obeys the recursion. Note that all the sequences {L it } are nonzero and therefore m-sequences
Let T r n m (x) denote the trace mapping from GF (2 n ) to a subfield GF (2 m ), where n = mk, defined by
It is well known that we can write any sequence over GF (2 m ) generated by g(x) in terms of the trace mapping. In particular the k sequences L it for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, can be represented in the form
where β is a zero (and a primitive element of GF (2 n )) of g(x) and A i ∈ GF (2 n ). During the shifting of the register the elements S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S t , . . . in GF (2 m ) are generated. Each element in GF (2 m ) is identified with an m-bit binary vector using a suitable basis. Let {µ 0 , µ 1 , . . . , µ m−1 } and {α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α m−1 } denote two dual bases for GF (2 m ) over GF (2) . Thus T r m 1 (µ i α j ) = δ ij where δ ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. We represent the element S t in GF (2 m ) as an m-bit binary vector given by S t = (s mt , s mt+1 , . . . , s mt+m−1 ) using the basis {α j }. Then
Then using the dual basis, we can find the components of S t by
Since the element S t and thus the bits s mt+j , j = 0, 1, . . . m − 1, are the input bits to the Boolean function at time t, it is useful to find an expression for any bit s r in terms of the initial bits s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 in the register. In particular, the lemma below provides a relation
t ) and u = mi + l, where 0 ≤ l < m and 0 ≤ i < k.
Proof. By definition, and using the representation of L it µ j in the basis {µ l }, we obtain from (2), (3) and (4) that
Using the trace representation of L it given in (3), and letting r = mt + j, we obtain
Finding the coefficient sequences
The filter function is a Boolean function f (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m−1 ) in m variables of degree d. For a subset A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a r−1 } of {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} we use the notation x A = x a0 x a1 · · · x ar−1 . The Boolean function can then be written as
where the summation is taken over all subsets A of {0, 1, . . . , m − 1}. The keystream bit z t , at time t, is computed by only selecting bits from the element S t = (s mt , s mt+1 , . . . , s mt+m−1 ) in the m-sequence over GF (2 m ) such that By expressing s mt , s mt+1 , and s mt+m−1 as a linear combination of s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 , we arrive at a system of equations of degree d relating the n unknowns s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 in the initial state to the keystream bits z t . This leads to a set of nonlinear equations for t = 0, 1, . . .
For any U = {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u r−1 } ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} let s U = s u0 s u1 · · · s ur−1 . Let K U,t be the coefficient of s U in the corresponding equation at time t, resulting from the keystream and the Boolean function via z t = f (s mt , s mt+1 , . . . , s mt+m−1 ). Then we can represent the system of equations as
In this section we investigate the properties of the coefficient sequences K U,t of s U . The crucial part of the attack depends on the properties of these sequences. The main observation is that these sequences have a nice structure. This is shown in [5] for the binary filter generator and will be proved also to be the case for the filter generator over an extension field. For simplicity, we first consider the contribution to the keystream from a Boolean function consisting of a single monomial of degree r, say f * = x a0 x a1 . . . x ar−1 , where 0 ≤ a 0 < a 1 < · · · < a r−1 < m. Let A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a r−1 }, u j = mi j + l j , B uj = A ij α lj , and l 
The summation runs over all combinations of u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u r−1 where the u j 's are in {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and such that U = {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u r−1 }. Therefore, for the general case, any Boolean function f of degree d in m variables can be written as a sum of monomials as f = A c A x A . Note in particular that each subset A of {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} such that |A| ≥ |U | contributes to the coefficient sequence K U,t . We therefore obtain
where
Let U ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a r−1 }. Let the sum below range over all r-tuples (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u r−1 ) where the u j 's are in {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and such that U = {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u r−1 }. Let for simplicity B ij = B 
In the following we will describe a useful lemma needed to find the minimum polynomial of the coefficient sequences K U,t . Let j i be integers such that 0 ≤ j i < n for i = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1. To any r-tuple (j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j r−1 ) we associate the integer defined by J = 2 j0 + 2 j1 + · · · + 2 jr−1
(mod 2 n − 1). Furthermore, the weight of J is denoted wt(J) and denotes the weight of the binary representation of J. Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 in [6] . We give the proof for completeness. Let wt(J) < |U |, where |U | denotes the number of distinct elements in I considered as a subset of {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Since, wt(J) < |U | it follows that two of the j i 's must be the same. Without loss of generality we can assume j 0 = j 1 = j. An important observation is that this implies that all terms cancel pairwise except the ones where u 0 = u 1 . The reason for this is that otherwise, if u 0 = u 1 , all the terms in T U,J will cancel pairwise since
Furthermore, since if j 0 = j 1 we can assume that u 0 = u 1 , it follows from the observation B Since wt(J) < |U | it follows that the second indices can not all be distinct. Thus we can repeat the argument until all the remaining u l 's are distinct. The fact that wt(J) < |U | implies that two of the remaining second indices must still be the same. Thus since the corresponding first indices now are different it follows that the terms in T U,J cancel pairwise and we obtain T U,J = 0.
2
It follows from the expression in (8) that K U,A,t can be written as
and Lemma 2 combined with (8) implies that |U | ≤ wt(J) ≤ |A| ≤ d = deg(f ) and some b J ∈ GF (2 n ). Therefore K U,A,t is generated by the binary polynomial p w (x) with zeros β J where w ≤ wt(J) ≤ d = deg(f ). Since K U,t is a linear combination of terms of the form K U,A,t , where |A| ≥ |U | it holds that
is also generated by p w (x).
For the coefficient sequences we have therefore proved the following lemma. As a consequence of this discussion it also follows in particular that z t is generated by p 1 (x). Lemma 3. Let K U,t be the coefficient sequence corresponding to s U for a Boolean function f of degree d. Then K U,t is generated by the polynomial p w (x) with zeros β J where w = |U | ≤ wt(J) ≤ d.
The generator polynomial p w (x) therefore generates all coefficient sequences K U,t for all sets of U such that w ≥ |U |. It follows that the polynomial p(x) = p 2 (x) with zeros β J where 2 ≤ wt(J) ≤ d generates all the coefficient sequences of degree 2 and larger. Therefore, using the recursion with characteristic polynomial p w (x) on the relation z t = f t (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) leads to a linear equation in the unknowns s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 since all nonlinear terms disappear due to the recursion.
Let Z f be the set of zeros that may occur as zeros of the minimum polynomial of the possible keystreams that may be generated by a filter generator. For a Boolean function of degree d then Z f is contained in the set β J where 1 ≤ wt(J) ≤ d. Observe that the zeros of the minimum polynomial of any coefficient sequence is a subset Z f . For example if the initial state is (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) = (1, 0, . . . , 0) then z t = K {1},t . Similarly any coefficient sequence corresponding to a linear term has their zeros in Z f . To show that this is the case for any coefficient sequence K U,t , we proceed by induction with respect to |U |. In general if the initial state has s i = 1 exactly when i ∈ U , then
contains the term K U,t and terms K V,t corresponding to proper subsets of V of U . Since the zeros of the minimum polynomial of z t are in Z f and the same is true, by induction, for the zeros of the minimum polynomial of all coefficient sequences K V,t for all proper subsets V of U , it follows that the zeros of the minimum polynomial of K U,t are also in Z f .
Thus we can perform essentially the same attack as in [6] also for the word oriented filter generator by deriving a set of linear equations in the n unknowns s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 and the bits in the keystream z t . The complexity of the attack will be as in [6] a pre-computation of complexity O(L(log 2 L)
3 ) and the actual attack is of complexity O(L), where L is the linear complexity upper bounded by
For the WG cipher the linear complexity L is given in [5] to be ≈ 2 45.0415 . The zeros of the generator polynomial of all possible keystream z t are known and the generator polynomial corresponding to the coefficient sequences of degree at least two can be generated similar to the techniques in [4] with complexity O (L(log 2 L) 3 ). The initial state in the WG cipher can be found in complexity ≈ 2 45.0415 using the same number of keybits, after a pre-computation of complexity 2 62 . One should, however, observe that the authors restrict the number of keybits on a given key to 2 45 .
One additionally interesting observation in studying the word oriented filter generator that we observe from our approach is that the linear complexity is sometimes significantly smaller than it would have been if the Boolean function had acted on all the bits in the initial state instead of limiting itself to the bits within one single word. However, in the special case when one uses the filter generator over GF (2 m ) there are large families of integers J such that b J = 0, no matter how the Boolean function is selected, as long as it acts on one element in the linear feedback shift register only. This observation may lead to a significant reduction of the linear complexity of z t .
Lemma 4. Let z t be the keystream obtained from the filter generator of length k with elements over GF (2 m ). Then the linear complexity of z t is at most
where n = mk.
Proof. The linear complexity of a keystream sequence z t is the number of nonzero coefficients in the expression for z t in terms of the zeros β J given by
The keystream z t can be written as a sum of coefficient sequences given by
We will show that for large families of integers J it holds that the coefficient b J of β Jt is zero for all coefficient sequences K U,t . Let
where the j To give a brief sketch of why this holds we again consider the description K U,t as a sum of terms of the form K U,A,t , where |A| ≥ |U |. It follows that it is sufficient to show that the coefficient of β Jt disappears in the description of K U,A,t for these values of J. The main idea is to extend the arguments in Lemma 2 in combination with the key fact that the µ aiji 's are in the subfield GF (2 m ). It follows from (8) that K U,A,t equals
Each J = 2 j0 + 2 j1 + · · · + 2 jr−1 contributing to this sum do not necessarily have distinct values of the j i 's. We assume that the unique binary representation of J is J = 2
where the j ′ i s are distinct. It follows from Lemma 2 that T U,J = 0 whenever wt(J) < |U |. In the case when wt(J) ≥ |U |, the arguments in Lemma 2 imply that T U,J can be represented in the form
Furthermore, subsets of the j i 's are combined to form the j Observe that the fraction of J's of weight wt(J) = w with b J = 0 for this case compared with the case when the Boolean function acts on bits in the initial state (when the linear complexity contribution from terms J of weight w is typically n w ) is therefore F rac(w) = n(n − k)(n − 2k) · · · (n − (w − 1)k) n(n − 1)(n − 2) · · · (n − (w − 1))
Hence, for large values of n = mk compared to k we obtain a rough estimate of F rac(w) = e −w(w−1)(k−1)/(2n)) . Since the main contribution to the linear complexity will normally come from the highest degree d a typically reduction in complexity will be by a factor of magnitude about e −d
Conclusions
The filter generator over an extension field uses a shift register of length k that generates an m-sequence S 0 , S 1 , . . . of period 2 mk − 1 over GF (2 m ) in combination with a Boolean function f of degree d that acts on a single element S t at any time t. An attack on the filter generator over GF (2 m ) has been described in this paper as an extension of the attack in [6] . The attack reconstructs the initial state in complexity O(L) after a pre-computation of complexity O (L(log 2 L) 3 ), where
An additional observation is that this construction reduces the linear complexity of the keystream, sometimes to a small fraction of the maximal possible linear complexity that would be possible by using the Boolean function on all bits instead of just using the bits confined to one single element of GF (2 m ).
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